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US XPRESS# INC.; C.V.
SOHN, INC.; SOUTHWEST
MOTOR FREIGHT, INC.;
UMTHUN TRUCKING COMPANY,
INC.; and WISCONSIN
EXPRESS LINES, INC.,
Case No. 940153-CA

Petitioners,

Priority No. 14

v.
OPERATIONS DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent•

000O000

POINTS OF LAW OR PACT FOR REVIEW
Petitioners request review of the portion of the November 18,
1994

opinion

in

this

matter

which

addresses

violations

of

Article I, §24 of the Utah Constitution. On page 8 of the opinion
the Court decided not to reach the arguments raised by petitioners
regarding equal protection and the uniform operation of the laws
based on the belief that such issues were not raised in the
administrative proceedings under review. Further, in footnote 7 on
page 8 of the opinion the Court ruled:
. . . the portions of the hearing transcripts cited by
petitioners fail to suggest that such concepts were in
any way "raised to a level of consciousness such that the
[Tax Commission could] consider it."
Petitioners seek review for the reason that the decision of
the Court on this issue is in error. Equal treatment under the Tax
Commission's Rule R865-4-2D was clearly a central focus of the

arguments below. The arguments brought to the attention of the Tax
Commission

the

essential

inequality

of

the Tax

Commission's

allowance of an exemption to certain special fuel users but not to
these petitioners.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE HEARING TRANSCRIPT ESTABLISHES THAT UNIFORM
TREATMENT UNDER THE LAW WAS A CENTRAL ISSUE BEFORE
THE TAX COMMISSION.

A primary focus of the position of these petitioners, both
before the Tax Commission and before this Court, has been that the
refusal to grant these petitioners an exemption for their nonpropulsion special fuel use amounts to unequal treatment compared
with other, similar non-propulsion users of special fuel. The way
in which this unequal treatment was highlighted

to the Tax

Commission was by reference to the Tax Commission's own Rule R8654-2D.

In this Rule the Tax Commission grants to a concrete mixer

truck, which is consuming special fuel while in a non-propulsion
mode, a 20% exemption from the special fuel tax.

The Rule,

likewise, grants to garbage trucks with trash compactors, using
special fuel in a non-propulsion mode, a 5% exemption.
References to this Rule and the unequal classifications it
creates are found throughout the transcript of the hearing.
transcript itself is forty pages in length.

The

The initial argument

of the petitioners covers twenty-six of those pages. References to
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Rule R865-4-2D begin on page 11 and cover, almost exclusively,
pages 18 through 26.
Not surprisingly, the Tax Commission hearing officer, at page
28 of the transcript, asked the Assistant Attorney General to
respond to the issues raised by Rule R865-4-2D. On page 30 of the
transcript the Assistant Attorney General attempted to argue that
there was a "substantial difference11 between the exemptions granted
by the rule and the exemption which these petitioners seek. Other
attempts by the respondent to justify the inequality is found on
page 31 of the transcript as well.
Finally, the rebuttal argument of these petitioners covers
pages 36 through 39 of the transcript.

The entire rebuttal

argument of the petitioners focuses on the differential treatment
granted by Rule R865-4-2D to similar users.
The following specific citations from the transcript are
examples of the manner in which the issue of unequal treatment
under the law was specifically raised and argued before the Tax
Commission:
1. At page 19 of the transcript, beginning on line 2, counsel
for petitioners makes the following statement:
And look what they do.
This Commission has
promulgated rules that say for a concrete mixer you get
20%; garbage trucks, 5%; and theyfve just sort of all
parked —
I donft know if theyfve ballparked them
necessarily, but they've come up with some arbitrary
percentages•

3

Now, I ask this Court to consider what is the
difference? What is the difference? And they don't even
worry about where that concrete mixer is sitting when
it's using its power takeoff to run its concrete mixer.
They don't even worry about it. They just say# Look,
there is a certain percentage of that fuel that's being
used, what? While the vehicle is not being propelled
down the roadways of this state. So, what are we going
to do? We are not going to tax it.

What is the difference, I ask you, between a
diesel concrete mixer sitting there on or off the road
and using its power takeoff and the engine running and a
tractor trailer on or off the road — and I submit to
your Honor they're off the road — but never the less,
what is the difference between that and one sitting there
running its air conditioner and its system? What is the
difference? There is none. (Emphasis added.)
2. At page 36 of the transcript, beginning at line 6, counsel
for petitioners makes the following argument:
I mean, we just — all I'm pointing this out for
is that they can't have it both ways. They can't say,
Well, operation means operation. All right, then if
operation means operation, then concrete trucks gotta
[sic] be taxed on all of their fuel because they're on.
The ignition is on, the engine is running; I don't care
if its moving or not, its operating. Because a concrete
truck isn't operating a separate piece of equipment, its
operating itself just in the same way that — you know,
it's operating its air conditioner while it's running the
mixture in back. It's operating itself. A garbage truck
is operating itself, okay?
So, if that is it, then the Commission is
obviously inconsistent, and I submit it isn't • • • •
The Commission is saying, Look, we recognize certain
circumstances where in some notion or another we're not
on the highways, traveling down the roads and doing all
of those things for which the fuel was intended to be
taxed, we're doing something else.
And, yes, in the next five seconds that concrete
truck may drive up on the street and drive away and then
4

that fuel is going to be taxed. In the same way that in
the next five seconds an over-the-road tractor trailer
drives up on the street and drives down the road and
takes off and that fuel's going to be taxed. But for the
government to say, Well, operation means something
different for us than it does for the rest of the
vehicles on the road
is
improper,
is highly
discriminatory and doesn't fly in the face of the
legislative intent. (Emphasis added.)
3.

At page 38, beginning on line 5, the following point is

made:
And all of the legislative and all of the rule-making
scheme is designed to differentiate between those uses.
I mean, that's what's there. It's all designed to do
that and all we're simply saying is that here's another
use that is designed to differentiate between and they
simply haven't done it. (Emphasis added.)
4. Lastly, beginning at line 24 on page 38 of the transcript,
the petitioners argue:
And so they've carved out exceptions because they
understand what the statute is for. This one is no
different than those exceptions and we'd asked that it be
adopted on that basis.
If any message was delivered to the Tax Commission by these
petitioners it was that they are entitled to the same treatment as
other similar users of special fuel.

The argument before the Tax

Commission was that if you were going to grant exemptions for
certain operations of certain vehicles, you must grant exemptions
to other similar vehicles with similar operations.
As was pointed out to the Tax Commission, it simply does not
make sense to allow an exemption for certain non-propulsion uses of
fuel, such as the operation of a cement mixer on a diesel truck
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while at the same time, on a wholesale basis, disallow the nonpropulsion

fuel

used

by

an

over-the-road

diesel

tractor.

Reasonable minds may differ as to the decision of the Tax
Commission, but there cannot be any dispute that the issue of
unequal treatment was raised and addressed to the Tax Commission.
POINT II:

THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE RAISING OF
THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION.

It is interesting to note that the respondent never once
objected to the raising of this issue before the Tax Commission.
The memoranda of the parties, filed in connection with the Motion
for Summary Judgment did not mention Rule R865-4-2D. Nevertheless,
at the hearing, as has been shown above, Rule R865-4-2D became a
central focus. Yet, despite repeated opportunities to do so, the
respondent did not object to arguments relating to the rule.
Respondent did not claim some sort of surprise or inadequate
preparation.

Indeed, as has been shown above, the respondent

attempted to argue that there was substantial differences between
the granting an exemption for a cement mixer and the failure to
grant an exemption for these petitioners.

(Tr. 30-31)

It is further interesting to note that the respondent made no
effort to argue this issue to this Court at the time of hearing.
Admittedly, the respondent raised, in its brief, the alleged
failure of petitioners to argue equal protection before the Tax
Commission.

Yet, Respondent gave no time to that argument during

the hearing process.
6

While these two failures do not necessarily constitute a
waiver by the respondent, they are instructive as to the state of
knowledge and awareness of these parties and the Tax Commission.
No one was misled or unsure as to the positions of the parties
before the Tax Commission.

Everyone understood that petitioners

were attacking the unequal treatment they receive under the law.
Petitioners argued that under the rules of the Tax Commission
itself there was authority to grant them similar treatment.

The

ruling of the Tax Commission was to grant unequal treatment.
POINT III:

REMAND FOR A
APPROPRIATE.

DETERMINATION

OF

THIS

ISSUE

IS

If one thing is clear, it is that the question of equal
protection and uniform operation of laws, and whether such was
raised, is disputed.

Perhaps the best forum for resolution of the

dispute is the Tax Commission.

The hearing officer knows whether

or not equal protection was an element of the argument made.
Before this Court rules on that issue, inquiries should be made to
the Tax Commission.
At the very least, this matter should be remanded with
instructions to the Tax Commission to consider and rule upon the
issue of whether or not these petitioners have been treated
unfairly and unequally under Rule R865-4-2D. If the Tax Commission
feels that it requires more information on that issue it could ask
for the same from the parties.

In this way, this Court could be

assured that the lower tribunal had been given full opportunity to
7

consider this issue.

Each party would then have its right to

review of that decision by this Court.

CONcmsyop
It is respectfully submitted that this Court has erred in
refusing to rule on the issue of equal protection and uniform
operation of the laws.
the Tax Commission.

These issues were hotly contested before

At the very least, if the Tax Commission has

failed to rule, a remand should be granted so that the issue can be
more squarely addressed. Petitioner's Request for Rehearing should
be granted.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 1994
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

WWCRAIG G. ADAMSON
ERIC P. LEE
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